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sincere thanks go to all the academic and administrative staff I have met (or emailed) at 
the NCFS during four years of studies. Without your forthcoming and friendly responses 
to my sometimes unconventional requests I would not have made it. Besides, the 
interaction I’ve had with NCFS staff has been characterized by something that I consider 
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This study examines the reasons why the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands have been unable to reach an agreement for the distribution of the Total 
Allowable Catch for Atlantic mackerel. Whereas the allocation previously was decided by 
the long-standing coastal states, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, changes in the 
mackerel’s migration pattern in a northward direction has led to Icelandic and Faroese 
requests for a larger portion of the resource.  The “mackerel conflict” breaks out in 2010 
and entails the use of sanctions as well as the setting of unilateral quotas in addition to 
those following from the coastal state agreement. The combined quota demands far exceed 
sustainable harvesting levels and will by all likelihood lead to overexploitation.  The 
research methods were qualitative and involved the application of two-level game theory 
and the consideration of “win-sets” to explain the absence of co-operative management. 
The main finding was that the pelagic fishers effectively enjoy veto power over the 
outcome of the negotiations, in particular in fishery-dependent Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands, but to a large extent in Norway as well. Also in the EU the affected fishers have a 
decisive influence, although only in political terms. The parties’ many attempts at 
influencing each other’s positions have so far had no discernable effects and the situation 
begins to bear resemblance to a “tragedy of the commons”.  
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Commercially important fish stocks crossing political borders in the ocean have many 
times led to serious conflicts between nations. In an ideal world all stocks (and all 
other marine resources for that sake) would be located within each nation state‟s 200 
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). If this was always the case, the stocks 
would be an entirely domestic issue and their management would be left to national 
authorities alone.  
 
In the real world however, the migratory range of fish stocks do not necessarily 
coincide with the jurisdictional boundaries of states, and stocks which move in and out 
of two or more states‟ EEZ, and sometimes in and out of international waters  as well, 
are quite common. In fact, many of the commercially interesting stocks of the North 
Atlantic, including the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, are as 
described above and therefore often referred to as straddling stocks
1
. Examples of such 
stocks are Barents Sea cod, Norwegian spring spawning herring, and North East 
Atlantic mackerel, which is the species of interest of this thesis.   
 
In the period from the 1950s to the 1970s the cod wars between Great Britain and 
Iceland clearly demonstrated how high the stakes can be with respect to a valuable 
natural resource. One of the most serious moments of the conflict happened in 1972 
when Iceland unilaterally extended its economic zone to 50 nautical miles. The 
ensuing confrontation with Great Britain involved the use of coast guard and military 
vessels, cutting of nets, ramming of fishing boats as well as legal confrontations in the 
International Court of Justice. In 1994 a Norwegian coast guard vessel opened fire 
with a non-armed grenade on an Icelandic trawler in the so-called “Loop Hole”, an 
area of international water in the Norwegian Sea. Again the issue of contention was 
fishing rights for cod. 
 
These examples show how disagreement over access to valuable natural resources can 
result in serious political conflicts that have the potential to influence bilateral 
                                                 
1
 These stocks are are sometimes called transboundary stocks.  
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relations negatively for a long time. In essence, these distributional conflicts occur 
when a better bargain for one party leads to another party or parties getting less 
(Asgeirsdottir 2008:10). Even though fish is a renewable resource, it is beyond doubt 
that a large fishing pressure on a given stock over time will result in less fish. The 
consequence is the familiar situation of overexploitation, where too many fishers chase 
too few fish. So, in a setting where two or more states have fishing rights or access to a 
given stock, their basic incentive will often be to aim for the largest possible portion of 
the resource. If the behavior of modern states was entirely de-coupled from 
international conventions and agreements and concerns for the environment, the end-
result would inevitably be an utterly depleted fish stock. The presences of constraints 
as the ones mentioned above normally help states avoid depletion. That said, there are 
today numerous examples of overexploited fish stocks, some even at the brink of 
extirpation, both in Europe and other parts of the world. 
 
1.1 Problem definition, research question and objective  
 
The species of interest of this thesis is the Atlantic mackerel. Although it for decades 
has been an important commercial species for many European coastal states , it has not 
been the subject of many heated conflicts, at least not in North Europe. This was to 
change in 2010. Although the gradual escalation of the conflict was well know to 
fishery scientists and national fishery officials in the years prior to this, it was not until 
2010 that the average newspaper reader was made acquainted with a new fishery 
conflict labeled “the mackerel war
2
”. In contrast to the (usually) bilateral conflicts of 
earlier controversies over fishing rights and quotas, the new conflict seemed even more 
complicated as it involves four different players: the European Union, Norway, Iceland 
and the Faroe Islands.  
 
A further escalation of the conflict happened on 29 July 2010, when Norway 
introduced a ban of mackerel landings by Icelandic and Faroese vessels. It has 
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 See for instance The Independent on 11 August 2010: ”Now Britain and Iceland go to war over the 
mackerel”. According to the article the mackerel war appears to be an echo of the 1970s cod war when 
British gunboats were sent to ward of Icelandic trawlers in disputed waters.  
4 
 





The mackerel conflict refers to the disagreement between the European Union and 
Norway on one hand, and Iceland and the Faroese Islands
4
 on the other, with respect to 
the distribution of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of North East Atlantic mackerel. 
The background for the conflict is the new migration pattern of parts of the mackerel 
stock whereby an increasingly large portion of it dwells in Icelandic and Faroese 
waters at certain times of the year. This trend has been particularly evident from 2008. 
In both Iceland and the Faroe Islands the presence of substantial amounts of mackerel 
is viewed as an important income opportunity and the two countries‟ pelagic fleets 
have increased their catches to a significant degree. It follows from this that the two 
parties are demanding a larger share of the TAC. 
 
The European Union and Norway for their part, claim that Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands do not have the right to exploit these resources since their history of non-
participation in the fishery does not give them equal fishing rights. The four parties 
have had numerous meetings with the aim of resolving the dispute and agree on a 
distribution of the TAC that all parties can accept, so far with little success. As a 
response to the refusal of the European Union and Norway to grant higher quotas to  
Iceland and the Faroe Island, the two latter have set unilateral mackerel quotas since 
2010. In retaliation, Norway has banned landings of mackerel from Icelandic and 
Faroese vessels, and the EU has been threatening to do the same.      
 
Based on the above outline my main research question is as follows: Why are the 
European Union, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands unable to agree on a 
distribution of mackerel that is acceptable to all parties?  
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 BBC News (Internet) 14 January 2011: “EU signals mackerel ban for Iceland ahead of more talks”. 
4
 The Faroese Islands have the status as constituent country of the Kingdom Denmark but outside the EU. 
Several areas of competence are the responsibility of Denmark, but in fisheries matters the Faroe Islands 
enjoy complete autonomy.  
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In my view the matter at hand is to a large degree a “classical conflict” on the 
distribution of a natural resource. What makes it additionally interesting is the fact that 
all involved states subscribe to sustainable management principles and that there is a 
great degree of consensus as to the size of the resource thanks to extensive scientific 
surveys conducted by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
In other words: even though the parties by and large know how much fish there is out 
there, and even though they are well familiar with the possible implications of 
overfishing, they do still not seem to agree. 
 
The objective of this thesis is therefore to explain the absence of an agreement and 
arrive at some conclusions as to which factors that appear to influence the parties‟ 
positions and priorities when they meet in international negotiations on mackerel. 
 
1.2 Methodology and structure of thesis 
 
Two important considerations influence the choice of method in scientific work: the 
objective and the problem definition (research question). Scholars often distinguish 
between two main types of methods: qualitative and quantitative methods. In general 
terms the major difference between qualitative- and quantitative methods is that the 
former transforms data to values and numbers, for instance in the form of statistical 
data, whereas the latter has a greater focus on the researcher‟s understanding and 
interpretation of meaning and social processes
5
. Qualitative data are thus data in the 
form of words from observations, interviews and documents, and it is important for the 
researcher to acknowledge that the words we study in our analysis are influenced by 
ourselves (Ruona 2005:2-3).  
 
The method used in this thesis belongs to the qualitative category. In particular I have 
made use of document analysis, interviews and questions sent by e-mail. With regard 
to documents I have studied literature in scientific books, reports and articles, 
newspaper articles, and official reports and memoranda from the national fisheries 
authorities. Some of the documents that would have been very relevant to this study, 
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 It should be noted that also in quantitative methods the conclusions ultimately rely on the researcher‟s 
interpretation of his results. 
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such as the delegations‟ internal protocols after each round of negotiations, are exempt 
from the public domain and therefore not available to students. However, interviews 
and questions sent by e-mail have been important additional sources of information.  
 
There are both negative sides and positive sides related to the two abovementioned 
methods. The major strength of qualitative research is that it focuses on the processes that 
lead to outcomes, which are normally not identified in quantitative research (Maxwell 
2005). Another perceived strength of the qualitative method is its flexibility of adjustment: 
one may change the structure of the analysis through the carrying out of the examination. 
The flexibility can also be a weakness as it may result in difficulty of collecting data of 
relevance. The quantitative method on the other hand, deals with these weaknesses by 
using standardized project descriptions. A common feature of qualitative methods is that 
they look at the distinctive character of a specific problem. This may leave little room for 
generalizations, but it renders good possibilities for making informed interpretations.  
 
In summary, the choice of problem of this thesis – understanding how four autonomous 
parties act and define their own positions in the context of international negotiations – is to 
a large degree a social process. To opt for a qualitative approach therefore seems justified. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
 
Given that the species of interest is mackerel, it seems fair to make a short introduction 
to its main characteristics, distribution, end use and economic value. Such an 
introduction will be made in chapter two. In chapter three the theoretical framework 
will be introduced. The underlying problem, the absence of co-operation on a shared 
natural resource is related to “the tragedy of the commons”, so a presentation of 
Hardin‟s work from 1968 is warranted. A central part of this chapter will be dedicated 
to Robert Putnam‟s (1988) two-level games model for international negotiations, and I 
will describe how I will apply his theoretical approach to my research question.  
 
In chapter four I will elaborate on the management of mackerel prior to the conflict 
and describe the sequence of events that led to it. In chapter five I will present the 
findings obtained from the application of procedures stated in chapter three. The main 
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focus will be on the information collected and assessed during my analysis of the 
negotiations process, and how and to what extent the various groups in the parties‟ 
domestic arenas influence priorities and positions.  
 
In chapter six I will discuss the findings in more detail and assess whether the two-
level model gives a satisfactory basis for answering my research question. In the 
discussions I also intend to draw on the lessons provided by Hardin‟s the tragedy of 
the commons. In the last part of the chapter I will discuss some future scenarios and 










The Atlantic mackerel is a streamlined and fast-swimming pelagic fish. It prefers 
temperate and cold waters and its main distribution areas are in the Northwest and 
North East Atlantic. It can also be found in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the 
Western Baltic Sea although the fisheries in these areas are of less importance.  
 
Little or no exchange seems to exist between the two North Atlantic distribution areas. 
The area of interest in this paper is the North East Atlantic, where fishery scientists 
break down the stock in three parts: a southern stock, a western stock, and a North Sea 
stock. The southern stock is found off the Iberian Peninsula and in the Bay of Biscay, 
with components as far south as the North African coast. The western stock is located 
west of the British Isles, and the North Sea stock resides in the North Sea.  
 
The map below shows the main distribution of North East Atlantic mackerel. The 
orange (dark) areas represent the spawning areas whereas the blue areas indicate the 
distribution in general. The location of the stocks depends on migration patterns which 




Figure 1: Main area of distribution of North East Atlantic Mackerel (source: IMR). 
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 In this chapter I have in particular benefitted from knowledge and results published by the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (IMR).   
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Although it is to a certain extent possible to speak of distinctive stocks, or spawning 
components, the three stocks are normally treated as one single stock for assessment 
and management purposes. The reason for this is that there is a great deal of contact 
and exchange between them, in particular the Southern and Western stocks. It is only 
the North Sea mackerel that is sufficiently distinct to be clearly identified as a separate 
spawning component. Still, during the second half of the year mackerel from the 
Southern and Western areas migrate to feed in the Norwegian and the North Sea and 
then they also mix with the North Sea component. 
 
The species undertake long migrations to its feeding grounds, in particular in summer 
and autumn, and it can form shoals of substantial size. Mackerel is a typically pelagic 
species though sometimes occurring near the bottom. It is mainly caught during spring, 
summer and autumn in continental shelf areas and along the shelf edge in waters of 15-
200 meters in depth. In the summer it may move into inshore waters where it is often 
an easy prey for recreational fishers. In the cold months mackerel stay at deep water.     
 
Mackerel grow to a maximum length of 60 cm although fish longer than 50 cm is 
uncommon. The mean length is about 30-35 cm. The species continues to grow 
throughout its lifespan but the annual increase is small after app. 2 years of age. It 
feeds on a variety of pelagic crustaceans as well as various small fish such as herring, 
sprat, sandeel and Norway pout. Feeding patterns vary seasonally and spatially.  
 
Mackerel is an oily fish, building up energy reserves during spring and summer which 
it needs both for migration and subsequent gonad development during the following 
winter. It stops feeding almost completely during winter. The species is an important 
forage species for predatory fish such as tunas
7
 but also for many dolphins, whales, 
seals, and seabirds. It thus plays an important role in the North Atlantic food web.  
 
Spawning occurs during spring and summer and progresses from south to north as the 
surface waters warm and fish migrate: the southern component spawns between 
February and June, whereas North Sea mackerel spawns between May and July.  
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 The Norwegian word for bluefin tuna, makrellstørje, is a direct reference to the mackerel‟s role as an 
important forage species for its much larger cousin. 
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2.1 Catches, end use and economic importance 
 
Prior to the end of the 1960s, the mackerel fishery only amounted to a small 
percentage of the herring landings in the North East Atlantic. Due to the considerable 
technological advance in the 1960s, catches of mackerel soon began to increase. In 
1964 200,000 tons were landed and in 1967 a peak of over 1 million tons was reached. 
The high exploitation rate was the likely cause for the drop in landings in 1970 and the 
following years. Since the mid-1970s annual catches have been in the range of 500,000 




Figure 2: Annual landings of North East Atlantic mackerel 1972-2009. Source: ICES. The high catches 
in the years 1993-94 led to concerns about excessive harvesting and stricter regulations were 
introduced. Since 2006 annual catches have again increased rapidly.  
 
Mackerel is today captured in a variety of ways, the most important ones being purse 
seine, pelagic trawling and hand line. The mackerel fishing fleet is primarily located in 
Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the EU. The EU fleet mainly consists of 
vessels from Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, France and Spain.  
 
Traditionally most of the purse seine catches were used for reduction purposes but 
from the mid-1980s the market for mackerel products used for direct human 
consumption started to expand, including in overseas markets. Mackerel is today 
traded in a variety of ways: fresh, frozen, smoked and canned. In the autumn mackerel 
11 
 
can contain as much as 30% fat and a substantial amount of fatty acids. The fish is a 




Although the end use of the fish varies from country to country, the following figures 
from the Norwegian Seafood Export Council probably gives a fair impression of the 
utilization of North East Atlantic mackerel: in 2009 93% of the exported Norwegian 
mackerel was frozen round fish and 3% was frozen fillets. Fresh mackerel thus only 
represented 4% of the exports. The most important markets were Japan, China, Russia, 
Turkey, Nigeria and the Netherlands, and the value of the exports in 2010 was 3 billion 
NOK
9
. Exports of mackerel from Norway have never before reached such values.  
 
According to the European Commission mackerel catches represented 6% of all EU 
capture fisheries in 2007 (in volume) making it the fourth most important species 
caught that year
10
. However, for the member states Great Britain and Ireland, the 
mackerel was by far the most important species. In some EU regions the mackerel is 
essential to the local fishing fleet. One such region is Scotland where the mackerel in 




For Iceland the fishery sector is of pivotal importance as it represents approximately 
8% of the country‟s GDP and 40% of its export earnings. Even though mackerel has 
not traditionally been an important species, this has changed in recent years as there 
has been a huge influx of mackerel into Icelandic waters which in turn has been 
targeted by the country‟s pelagic fleet. This has resulted in a significant increase in 
landings and exports, mainly to Russia, East Asian countries and the United States. It 





Much of the North East Atlantic mackerel is exported overseas, but the fact that there 
are currently ten mackerel fisheries in the Fishery Certification Program of the Marine 
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 Tryggmat.no: “Trygg behandling av sjømat” (”Safe Treatment of Seafood” – my translation). Web article. 
9
 Norwegian Seafood Export Council 12 January 2011: “Mackerel boosts pelagic sector”. Web article. 
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 European Commission (2010): “Facts and figures of the Common Fisheries Policy”. 
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 The Fish Site: “Mackerel Prices in 2010”, 17 March 2011. Web article. 
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 Fishupdate.com on 25 January 2011: “Iceland finds willing markets for its mackerel”. Web article. 
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Stewardship Council (MSC), a major player in the seafood certification sector, 




Profitability in the mackerel fisheries depends on the market price which in turn 
fluctuates according to market conditions, availability of fish and consumer 
preferences. As mackerel is targeted only at certain times of the year the fishing 
vessels of this fishery will normally catch other species outside the mackerel season, 
typically other pelagic species. The profitability of the “mackerel industry” will 
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3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The problem definition of this thesis is how we can explain the absence of an 
agreement for the mackerel fishery in terms of the priorities and positions of the four 
involved parties. To analyze this question I will use theories from the field of political 
science. The rational choice perspective of the well known “tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin 1968) will be used to elucidate why there is a need for collective action to 
manage a natural resource like the mackerel. Thereafter I will employ the so-called 
two-level games in international negotiations (Putnam 1988) to examine the parties‟ 
priorities and positions and attempt to make informed conclusions with respect to my 
research question. 
 
3.1 How theory can guide us 
 
If our ambition is to conduct scientific research, a central objective should be to expand 
our understanding of the phenomena we are focusing on. In doing this we depend on 
theories and the development of theories. A scientific theory comprises a collection of 
concepts including abstractions of observable phenomena expressed as quantifiable 
properties, together with rules (called scientific laws) that express relationships between 
observations of such concepts
14
. A somewhat less rigid definition refers to theories as 
concepts which may be used to shed light on a real situation or phenomenon in society.  
 
Even though they may be very different in structure and content, all theories share the 
common trait of being abstracts of concrete phenomena. Theories can be both simple and 
complex, and while some are rigid in their form and application others are more flexible 
and open-ended.  
 
Instead of theory we sometimes speak of theoretical frameworks. A theoretical 
framework refers to a collection of interrelated concepts like a theory, but not 
necessarily so well worked-out (Borgatti 1999). It guides our research, determining 
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 Wikipedia: “Scientific theory”. Web article accessed on 1 May 2011. 
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which things you will measure, and what relationships you will look for. Typically, a 
theoretical framework defines the type of variables that you will want to look at.  
 
In this sense, the selection of a theoretical framework is both a clarifying and exclusionary 
step in the research process
15
. While it sharpens focus and consequently increases clarity 
brought to the problem area, it excludes from the view of the inquirer other perspectives 
that might be brought to bear on the problem, but does so in explicit recognition of those 
perspectives and the rationale for their rejection. 
 
3.2 The tragedy of the commons in fisheries 
 
The tragedy of the commons was described in a famous article by biologist Garret 
Hardin in 1968. Ever since its publication the article has had a tremendous influence 
on studies on the utilization of scarce natural resources.  
 
Hardin's analysis focuses on a pasture that herders use in common for grazing their 
cattle. There are no problems with the common usage of the pasture until the number 
of animals reaches the carrying capacity of the pasture. In order to gain extra profits, 
herders add additional animals to the common pasture. The problem is that each 
additional animal means more grazing in the pasture, and the continual addition of 
animals eventually leads to overgrazing. The end result is the destruction of the 
pasture. In the words of Hardin (1968:4): "Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited". 
 
He used the expression as a metaphor for the problems of overuse and degradation of 
natural resources including the overexploitation of fish resources, the overharvesting 
of timber, and the degradation of water resources. The word tragedy refers to the 
depletion of the common natural resource, and the commons stands for common 
ownership, hence the absence of private ownership and property rights. 
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Fisheries are similar to Hardin‟s pasture in that increased fishing pressure has caused 
certain stocks of fish to become overfished to a point that threatens the survival of the 
fishery. In many fisheries all the conditions described by Hardin are met: an 
unrestricted number of users, unconstrained by any limits on their access, extract an 
increasing share of a resource until the resource is severely depleted. Fishers tend to 
have little incentive to practice conservation because they know that if they do not 
catch the available fish, someone else probably will.  
 
The main line of reasoning of Hardin is that humans are egoistically calculating actors 
who will bring a common resource to extinction if they are not subjected to social 
arrangements which imply coercion of some sort. He argues that one must accept 
controls on individual freedom or we will all suffer the tragedy of the commons as a 
result of population increase. He recommends that the only kind of coercion is a form 
of coercion mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected. 
 
Hardin‟s article has inspired numerous studies of overharvesting and destruction of 
natural resources, and his proposal to introduce controls on individual freedom has 
influenced scholars who analyze the development and effectiveness of international 
regimes.  
 
Another and related way of looking at the tragedy of the commons, is to study it as a 
collective action problem. A collective action problem refers to the incapacity of 
individuals to solve on their own a problem which requires co-operation for an optimal 
result (Ostrom 2003). Without co-operation they actors may well act rationally on an 
individual level, but the sum of these actions leads to an outcome that does not serve 
the interests of the group as a whole. In other words: individual rationality leads to 
collective irrationality.  
 
The research on collective action problems has often focused on the overexploitation 
of public goods, i.e. goods where one individual‟s use of a good does not exclude other 
individuals from using the same good. Examples of such goods may be “clean air” or 
“absence of extreme weather due to measures mitigating climate change”. In addition 
scholars have analyzed the problem of free riders: individuals who attempt to benefit 
16 
 
from a public good without paying for it (Anderson 2004:59). With regard to fisheries  
this occurs when a participant in a given fishery shows no constraints himself but 
simply wishes to benefit from the preservation efforts of others.  
 
A natural resource like the mackerel is not a public good in the traditional sense. 
Nevertheless, fish is difficult to exclude people from using as it in principle is no 
man‟s property (Hoel and Kvalvik 2005:347). As a renewable resource, its use tends to 
be of a rival nature – one person‟s use of it has consequences for others. These two 
characteristics, non-excludability of users and rivalness of consumption, make fish a 
so-called common pool good. Such goods are susceptible to a tragedy of the commons 
if their use is not properly managed (ibid).  
 
In the political science literature Hardin‟s work is regarded as an example of rational 
choice perspective to human behavior. The extreme form of this line of thinking is that 
users will invariably bring unregulated common natural resources to extinction. In 
contrast we have the co-operative action theorists, who claim that actors are more 
complex in their fundamental orientation than in the case of the rational choice 
perspective, and that their actions can be explained on the basis of social norms in 
addition to a pursuit of self-interest. Additionally, if we were to transfer the insights of 
Hardin‟s model onto the behavior of states, we would reach the obvious conclusion 
that a state is far more complex than an individual. For a start, a state is not always 
unitary in its views and its politics can rather be defined as the sum of different and 
sometimes diverging groups (Hveem 1996). What in the end becomes official policy is 
a result of interaction between the domestic realm, where confrontations between 
domestic interests unfold, and international considerations. 
 
According to Jentoft (2004) we may regard Hardin‟s model as a useful analytical 
model rather than an empirical representation. The tragedy of the commons should be 
viewed as an “ideal-type” tragedy which can be a helpful tool for comparison with real 
world situations. If we discover that Hardin‟s model does not describe what we see in 
the real world, the disparity between what the model predicts and what reality reveals 




Jentoft gives several examples of fisheries related studies where the use of the model 
and its management prescriptions have been controversial. The introduction of 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), in effect a way of privatizing access to fish 
resources, has been justified with reference to Hardin‟s model. However, the 
assumptions of perfect market conditions and rationality are often not transferable  to 
the actual world. If social relations are not structured according to the principles of the 
market, the introduction of ITQs may have undesirable effects on the social web of 
coastal communities.  
 
Another line of criticisms stems from the model‟s emphasis on coercion, for example 
in the form of state intervention, as a solution to the management problem. According 
to some scholars this underestimates the ability of local communities to regulate access 
to, and extraction from, a common pool of fish resources. The basic assumption is to a 
large extent Hardin “turned upside down”: the use of a common resource does not lead 
to unavoidable depletion. On the contrary, resource dependency provides local 
communities with an inherent interest in sustainable resource use. This line of 
reasoning paves the way for management arrangements which recognize both the role 
of government agencies and the importance of local involvement and responsibility 
(co-management). 
 
There are many lessons to be drawn from Hardin‟s article and the associated studies in 
the field of collective action problems and common pool goods. One important lesson 
is that the actors who have access to a shared resource are best served by agreeing on a 
common policy with regard to its utilization. 
 
3.3 International negotiations as two-level games 
 
A theoretical framework which takes both the domestic and international levels into 
consideration in a fruitful interplay, is Putnam‟s (1988) two-level game theory. 
Whereas the tragedy of the commons is related to rational choice theory and a one-
level perspective, the two-level games are associated with co-operative action theory 
and an institutional perspective. An important distinction between the two is that the 
tragedy of the commons can function as a rationale behind the need for management, 
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while two-level games have the potential to explain how and why management 
outcomes are brought about (or not brought about).  
 
Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of 
domestic conflict about what the national interest requires. It recognizes that central 
decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives 
simultaneously (Asgeirsdottir 2008). 
 
The acknowledgement of the role of domestic concerns in formulating national 
priorities and positions has been a central feature in studies of international politics for 
decades. However, Putnam‟s article is by many viewed as one of the most successful 
attempts to bring the domestic and international levels together in a systematic manner. 
It is therefore no coincidence that his approach has been applied in numerous studies 
in the field of political science and related disciplines.    
 
An important element of the “social process” to be studied in this thesis is  the 
international negotiations between the parties participating in the fishery of North East 
Atlantic mackerel. The negotiations are in many ways the most visible stage of the 
process and an arena where the parties make statements, express agreement or 
disagreement, seek common ground, and forge deals. It therefore makes sense to put 
negotiations at the centre of our analysis. 
  




According to Putnam the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be 
conceived as a two-level game. The assumption is that each party is represented by a 
chief negotiator and that this individual has no independent policy preferences, but 
simply seeks to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents. The 
process is decomposed into two stages: 
 
                                                 
16
 Putnam‟s theoretical framework is a relatively extensive and not all the features discussed in his article are 
equally relevant to the fisheries negotiations studied in this thesis. I have therefore chosen to focus on what I 
consider to be the most relevant features. 
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1. Bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement (Level I)  
2. Separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify 
(accept) the agreement (Level II) 
 
The decomposition into a negotiation phase and a ratification phase is useful for 
purposes of exposition, although it is not descriptively accurate. In real life exceptional 
effects will be quite important. There are for instance likely to be prior consultations 
and bargaining at Level II to define an initial position for the Level I negotiations. 
Conversely, the need for Level II ratification is certain to affect the Level I bargaining. 
In fact, expectations of rejection at level II may abort negotiations at Level I without 
any formal action at Level II. In many negotiations, the two-level process may be 
iterative, as the negotiations try out possible agreements and probe their constituents‟ 
views. There may also be cases where the constituents‟ views themselves evolve in the 
course of negotiations.  
 
Ratification may entail a formal voting procedure at Level II, such as parliamentary 
approval. However, in this setting the term refers more generically to any decision-
process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement. The 
actors at Level II may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes 
or even “public opinion”. 
 
At the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among these groups. At the international level national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two levels can be ignored by 
central decision makers. 
 
Each chief negotiator appears at both the domestic and international level. Across the 
international table sit her foreign counterparts, and at her elbows sit diplomats and 
other international advisors. Around the domestic table behind her sit party and 
parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key 
interest groups, and the leader‟s own political advisors. The composition of the 
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delegation varies across issues. In fisheries negotiations the delegation is rarely headed 
by a minister, but rather a senior official from the fisheries authorities. However, it is 
common that the head of delegation has easy access to the political leadership during 
important phases of the negotiations, to be able to quickly clarify important issues.  
 
The complexity of the two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one 
board may be impolitic for the same player at another board. Nevertheless, there are 
powerful incentives for consistency between the two games.  
 
3.4.1 The importance of win-sets 
 
According to Putnam, every country has a domestic win-set, which consists of all 
bargaining outcomes which would “win” approval of the majority of the constituency 
at home. 
 
Win-sets are important for two reasons. First, countries will only reach an agreement if 
their win-sets overlap. Hence large and overlapping win-sets facilitate cooperation. 
Conversely, the smaller the win-sets the greater the risk that the negotiations will 
break down. For example, during the lengthy and intense negotiations for a new 
political agreement to combat climate change in Copenhagen in December 2009, 
within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, several 
proposals and tentative texts were launched and subsequently rejected by one or more 
of the negotiating parties. When it transpired that the countries‟ win-sets did not 
overlap, several heads of government left the negotiations and it soon became clear 
that the meeting was a failure.  
 
Second, the size of the win-set will influence the distributive outcome of the 
negotiations in such a way that a country with a large win-set (that is, with fewer 
constraints in what it can demand and offer) can be pushed around by a country with a 
narrower and more constrained win-set. In other words, a small domestic win-set can 
be a bargaining advantage. A frequently used tactic in this regards is lamenting the 
domestic constraints under which one must operate.  
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3.4.2 The factors determining the size of win-sets 
 
According to Putnam there are three main factors determining the size of the win-sets:  
 
1. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences and 
possible coalitions among Level II constituents. 
 
For example, the lower the cost of “no-agreement” to constituents, the smaller the win-
set. No-agreement often represents the status quo, although in some cases no-
agreement may in fact lead to worse outcomes. A case where actors have unrestricted 
access to a natural resource over time leading to its depletion, may be one example. 
Furthermore, some constituents will face low costs from no-agreement, and others 
high costs, and the former will be more skeptical of Level II agreements than the latter. 
In some cases, evaluation of no-agreement may be the only significant disagreement 
among the Level II constituents, because their interests are relatively homogenous. In 
this case the constituents may be composed of hard-liners and doves where their 
attitude towards an agreement depends on their costs of losing it, and the more the 
negotiator can win at Level I the better the odds for ratification on Level II.   
 
Participation rates vary across groups and issues, and this variation often has 
implications for the size of the win-set. For example, when the costs or benefits of a 
proposed agreement are relatively concentrated, it is reasonable to expect that those 
constituents whose interests are most affected will exert special influence on the 
ratification process.  
 
2. The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions. 
 
A case in point is the ratification procedure. For instance, if the ratification procedure 
changes from simple majority in parliament to a two-thirds majority, the win-set will 
decrease correspondingly. However, fisheries agreements as the ones dealt with here 
are normally not put to vote in the national assemblies. It should be noted that 
ratification procedures do not always have to formalized, they can also take the form 
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of meetings or informal consultations with institutions and interest groups which 
eventually accept or reject the agreement.  
 
Some institutional arrangements require several levels of ratification, like the 
ratification of new constituent treaties in the European Union. The ratification 
requirements for fisheries agreements are less complex, but a certain involvement of 
fish industry associations, member countries and EU institutions is always necessary. 
 
3. The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators. 
 
Each negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other side‟s win -set. If 
he knows that his opponent‟s constituents are divided he may wel l try to exploit the 
differences. For example, he can make the case that his own constituents and parts of 
the opponent‟s constituents really have the same interests. The more the chief 
negotiator knows about the composition and interests of the other parties‟ constituents 
the better. Another way of expanding his adversary‟s win-set is to use threats of 
sanctions. If these are perceived as real and/or potentially damaging, they may work to 
his advantage. However, there is also the risk of provoking and antagonizing the other 
party to the extent that his opponent‟s win-set is reduced instead.   
 
With respect to his own win-set the chief negotiator‟s motives are mixed. The larger 
the win-set, the easier he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker the 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the other parties. A often used strategy to appear strong 
and committed to a given position on Level I, is to rally support from the constituents 
and use this as verbal ammunition in the negotiations. An example could be references 
to a situation where impoverished fishery communities would literally “be wiped out” 
if their fishing opportunities are reduced. The risk about this tactic is that expectations 
among the constituents are set too high, hampering the subsequent ratification of a 
compromise agreement. Still, interest groups will normally tolerate some differences 




A technique used to expand one‟s win-set is to offer side-payments to constituents. In 
a two-level game the side-payments may come from unrelated domestic sources or 
they may be received as part of the international negotiation.    
 
Restructuring and reverberation. 
 
Much of what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players to 
restructure the game and to alter one another‟s perceptions of the costs of no -
agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements. Such tactics are, according to 
Putnam, more difficult in two-level games than in conventional negotiations because it 
is often hard to reach constituents on the other side with persuasive messages. This, 
however, will depend on whether constituents in opposing states only have divergent 
interests. Nevertheless, a government involved in international negotiations will 
frequently try to change the other party‟s perception of the stakes to its advantage. If 





In this chapter I tried to answer the question why we need management of natural 
resources by means of Hardin‟s work on the tragedy of the commons. We learned that 
unless the parties with access to the resource engage in some form of co-operation, the 
likely result is depletion of the resource. Based on this there appears to be a strong 
case for states to engage in negotiations with a view to achieving binding agreements 
for the utilization and management of the resource.  
 
Given that international negotiations are at the centre of these efforts , I presented 
Putnam‟s model of two-level games where the key concept is that in international 
negotiations there is both an international and a domestic level, and that an agreement 
only can be reached if the constituents on the parties‟ domestic arenas accept it. This 
situation is referred to as overlapping win-sets. The size of the win-sets is thus an 




In its original version Putnam‟s two-level metaphor was mainly applied to bilateral 
negotiations. However, there are no features of the model excluding its application on 
a larger multilateral setting. In the next chapter this is what I will do.  
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4.0 THE ROAD TO FULL SCALE CONFLICT 
 
Before I apply the theoretical framework on the information and data I have collected, 
it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the institutional setting in which the 
mackerel negotiations take place, and the sequence of events that led to the conflict. 
There are also other issues that need to be brought to light: North East Atlantic 
mackerel is a straddling stock, but which ocean areas are we talking about, how was 
mackerel managed prior to the conflict, which institutions and arrangements had a role 
in the management decisions, what caused the outbreak of the mackerel conflict, and 
what is the present status? Below I deal with these questions in turn. 
 
4.1 Institutional setting and management of mackerel prior to the conflict 
 
In recent years the management of North East Atlantic mackerel – and in this context 
“management” primarily refers to quota negotiations – has been a matter settled by the 
long-standing coastal nations in the mackerel fishery: the EU, Norway and the Faroe 
Islands. In 1999 the four parties adopted an international coastal state agreement for 
the fishery which laid down key principles and reference points for the management of 
the resource. In October 2008 it was replaced by a new agreement. An important 
feature of the new agreement was the resetting of relationships between biological 





The coastal states typically meet once a year to agree on a Total Allowable Catch for 
the following year, and the distribution of it between the parties. The distribution of 
the TAC has been pretty predictable since the adoption of the first of the two coastal 
state agreements mentioned above: the lion‟s share of the quota would go to the EU 
and Norway, who then had to agree on the exact split in bilateral negotiations, and the 
Faroe Islands would get a small part, around 5%, as there traditionally was little 
mackerel in the Faroese EEZ.  
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 “Agreed Record of Conclusions of Fisheries Consultations between the Faroe Islands, the European 
Community, and Norway on the Management of Mackerel in the North-East Atlantic for 2009”, signed on 
31 October 2008. 
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The notion of coastal state merits some elaboration. In fishery terminology coastal 
state means that you have a history of catching mackerel and/or that mackerel has been 
found within your country‟s EEZ “over time”. However, there is no universally 
accepted definition of coastal state with respect to a given fishery. For example, how 
much mackerel must there be in your EEZ before you become a coastal state? Is it 
sufficient that your fleet has been targeting mackerel for only a couple of years? Since 
the status of coastal state also implies fishing rights, there is often much discussion on 
whether a nation should be granted this status or not. In general terms existing coastal 
states will be reluctant to confer this status to new entrants in the fishery.  
 
The annual coastal state agreement deals with the mackerel within the EEZs. As the 
mackerel moves in and out of the countries‟ EEZ, and not always in a predictable 
manner, it is common to agree on “swaps of quotas” within the national quotas. This is 
done on a bilateral basis. For example, during their annual negotiations on the bilateral 
split of their part of the overall TAC, the EU and Norway will normally agree that their 
fishers can catch a (clearly defined) part of their quota within the EEZ of the other 
party. The question whether these quotas are actually used or not depends on the 
seasonal migrations of the mackerel. 
 
Although the conflict level with respect to mackerel has been relatively low for quite 
some years there are also examples of the opposite: in October 2009 a row erupted 
between Norway and the EU when the latter denied Norwegian fishers access to catch 
mackerel in its waters
18
. In the view of Norway this was a clear violation of an earlier 
bilateral agreement. The controversy was solved by negotiations and a new bilateral 




In addition to the mackerel in the EEZs there is also the mackerel in international 
waters, which is managed by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
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NRK (Internet) on 2 October 2009: “EU stopper norske fiskere” (“EUs stops Norwegian fishers”, my 
translation). Web article. 
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 Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs on 28 January 2010: “Norway and the EU have 
concluded a bilateral fisheries agreement for 2010 and a long term agreement on management of North East 





. As the three traditional coastal states are members of the Commission it is 
for all practical purposes these states which claim the mackerel quotas for the NEAFC 
management area, with the exception of a minor part given to other nations, most 














Figure 3: Map of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and international waters in parts of the North East 
Atlantic. The blue (darker) areas are international waters, where the fish stocks are managed by the 
North Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
 
A part of the NEAFC quota has also been offered to Iceland, but Iceland has objected 
to accept this arrangement. In accordance with the NEAFC Convention, member states 
have the possibility to object to a management measure made by the other members 
under certain circumstances. If such an objection is filed the country is in principle not 
bound by the measure. However, as long as there was little or no mackerel inside the 
Icelandic EEZ and in adjacent international areas, there was not much attention paid to 
this circumstance.  
      
                                                 
20
 The members of NEAFC are: Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the EU, Iceland, 




4.2 Stock assessments and Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
 
In the case of mackerel and many other species of the North East Atlantic, the TAC is 
based on the assessments elaborated by the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Sea (ICES), a Copenhagen based scientific body which conducts annual stock 
assessment surveys and collects various data on the marine environment
21
.The 
principles of sustainable management and precautionary harvesting levels are key in 
ICES‟ work. Through surveys and samples, ICES attempts to determine the likely 
population of important species, the rate at which they will mature, and the rate at 
which the fish can be removed without jeopardizing the fishery.  
 
The annual ICES‟ report with stock assessments and advice on sustainable harvesting 
levels enjoys high credibility among the member states, and despite the inherent 
uncertainties in stock assessments there is seldom much discussion of the ICES‟ 
estimates during negotiations. When the fishery nations in this part of Europe realize 
that there is a need to build up a specific stock, they have come to regard ICES‟ 
assessments as crucial for setting a sensible harvesting level. Inputs from ICES have 
also been important for the discussions leading to the coastal state agreement on 
mackerel adopted in October 2008. ICES considered the agreement to be 
precautionary, provided that TAC equals the total removals from the stock (ICES 
2009:1). 
 
4.3 The conflict breaks out 
 
That mackerel undertakes long seasonal migrations to spawn and feed is a well know 
fact. Nonetheless, the developments which have unfolded in the North East Atlantic 
since circa 2006 came as a surprise to many, both marine scientists and fishers.  
 
Iceland is not historically an important mackerel-fishing nation and its pelagic fleet 
has mostly been geared towards herring and other clupeids. However, from 2006 
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 Most European coastal states are members of ICES and the bulk of the scientific work produced by ICES 
is carried out by national fishery research institutes. Some of the surveys are joint surveys where scientific 
personnel and vessels from two or more countries partake.   
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mackerel started to appear within the Icelandic EEZ to an ever increasing degree. The 
pelagic fleet, which at the time experienced a reduction of its catches of herring, began 
fishing for mackerel: in 2006 the Icelandic fishing vessels caught 4,200 tons, in 2007  
36,000 tons, and in 2008 the catch jumped to 112,000 tons. In 2009 the catches of 
mackerel again increased, to 116,000 tons (see also figure 4 below).  
 
According to the Icelandic Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture there was “a mass 
migration into Icelandic EEZ”
22
. As Iceland was not a party to the coastal state 
arrangement for mackerel, this volume was not a part of any fishery agreement. It 
therefore came in addition to the quantities that had been agreed by the EU, Norway 




Figure 4: Annual catches of mackerel in Icelandic waters 1950-2009. Source: ICES/Statistics Iceland. 
 
The growing Icelandic catches did not go unnoticed in the EU and Norway, and also 
ICES commented on the issue in the following way: “Unregulated fisheries outside the 
agreed management plan taken in Icelandic waters and amounting to more than 16% of 
the total catch in 2008 are a cause for concern”
 
(ICES 2008:77). Still, the overall 
assessment on the state of the stock was relatively positive in the sense that it was 
considered to be at full reproductive capacity although at increased risk with respect to 
the set precautionary levels for fishing mortality. 
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 Icelandic Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture: “Atlantic Mackerel”. Web article accessed on 5 May 2011. 
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The fairly good state of the stock was one of the reasons why the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) certified the Scottish Pelagic Sustainability Group, the owner of 21 
large pelagic trawl vessels mainly fishing on the western component of the mackerel 
stock, as environmentally sustainable in January 2009
23
. This was the eighth North 
East Atlantic mackerel fishery to be certified by MSC. In May that same year the 
Faroese Pelagic Organization filed an application for MSC certification of its mackerel 
fisheries
24
.   
 
Despite ICES‟ concerns over the unregulated Icelandic fishery there were, at least in 
Norway, some indications in 2009 that the long-term objective would be to also 
incorporate the Icelandic catches in the coastal state arrangement. It was claimed, 
however, that the Icelandic stance so far had been “out of proportions” and that they 
had been unwilling to co-operate
25
. Icelandic authorities for their part, had a very 
different view. It was claimed that Iceland for a number of years had requested to 
participate in the coastal state consultations on the management of mackerel, but that 
this had been rejected by the other coastal states which then in effect had excluded 




The Icelandic position with regard to the mackerel fishery was firmly established in 
November 2009 when the Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture announced a unilateral 
quota for 2010 of 130,000 tons.  Iceland defended this decision by pointing to its lack 
of access to quota negotiations and a rapidly increasing amount of mackerel in its 
waters. Shortly thereafter the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands extended an invitation 
to Iceland to participate in the coastal state negotiations on mackerel in 2010
27
. In 
reality this meant that the country was finally considered to be a coastal state with 
regard to mackerel. 
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 Seafood Scotland: “SPSG mackerel achieves MSC certification 21st January 2008“. Web article accessed 
on 4 May 2011. 
24
 Marine Stewardship Council on 21 May 2009: “Faroese Pelagic Organisation enters mackerel and herring 
fisheries for MSC assessment”. Web article. 
25
 Aftenbladet.no on 26 October 2009: ”Norge har startet forhandlinger om makrellen” (”Norway has started 
negotiations on mackerel”, my translation). Web article. 
26
 Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture on 7 April 2009: ”Regarding Icelandic Mackerel Fisheries 
in 2009“. Press release/web article. 
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In parallel to the developments in Icelandic waters, the Faroe Islands also increased 
their mackerel catches significantly in 2010. In July the local authorities declared a 
unilateral quota of 85,000 tons, which was three times the traditional Faroese quota 
entitlement under the coastal state agreements. With this measure the Faroe Islands in 
effect broke out of the institutional arrangement represented by those agreements.  
 
The quota increases caused anger in the Norwegian and EU mackerel fleets , and it was 
apparent that the time for tougher measures had arrived. Norway took swift action and 
introduced a ban on mackerel landings from both Icelandic and Faroese vessels on 29 
July 2010. The initiative spurred Scottish calls for similar measures to be taken by the 
EU. Such measures were not introduced however, but the EU Commissioner for 
Fisheries said that “the Commission would contemplate all necessary measures to 
conserve the mackerel stock and safeguard EU interests”
28
. Nevertheless, in August 
and September 2010 angry local fishermen prevented Faroese vessels from unloading 




4.4 From bad to worse 
 
The seriousness of the situation became evident when comparisons were made 
between ICES‟ advice for 2010 and the actual quotas for that year: the scientists had 
recommended a maximum TAC of 570,000 tons, whereas the actual catches were 
heading towards 930,000 tons. In the annual ICES Advice the following was 
commented: “The absence of effective international agreements on the exploitation of 
the stock (between all nations involved in the fishery) is a cause of continued concern 
and prevents control of the exploitation rate” (ICES 2010:31-32). 
 
The serious disagreement between the parties prevented any real progress throughout 
2010 despite a series of meetings between coastal state officials in London, Oslo and 
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 FishnewsEU.com on 9 August 2010: “All necessary measures to be considered by Commission following 
Faroese mackerel quota declaration”. Web article. 
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Copenhagen. On the margin of the Copenhagen meeting, in December, the 
disagreement also started to have negative repercussions on other agreements as it 





Later the same month the Icelandic Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture decided to set 
the country‟s mackerel quota for 2011 at a level of 146,818 tons. The announcement 
was accompanied by a request to the other coastal states to take Iceland‟s share into 




A new round of mackerel talks, the seventh round, was held in Oslo on 9-11 March 
2011. Again the negotiations come to naught. Shortly thereafter the Ministry of 
Fisheries of the Faroe Islands declared that a unilateral mackerel quota of 150,000 tons 
had been set for 2011. Like in Iceland the decision was accompanied by calls to the 
other coastal states to take the Faroese quota into account and it was highlighted that 
“the obligation shared by the coastal states to seek consensus on mackerel management 
must be approached by all parties on an equal footing, with a clear recognition of the 




By adding the Icelandic and Faroese quotas to the already existing quotas of the EU 
and Norway, which are determined by the long-term agreement of January 2010, we 
arrive at a total estimated catch of 942,818 tons in 2011. This figure is 46% in excess 
of 646,000 tons, which is the level of fishing considered sustainable by ICES. 
Although all parties express concern over the future of the stock the willingness to 
reconsider own positions seems limited. 
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 The annual quota agreement also deals with a range of other species including demersal species and 
herring.  
31
 Icelandic Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture on 20 December 2010: “Decision on Iceland‟s share in 
Mackerel Fisheries in 2011”. Press release. 
32
 Worldfishing.net on 15 March 2011: ”Faroese mackerel fisheries in 2011”. Web article. 
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5.0 THE MACKEREL NEGOTIATIONS AS A TWO-LEVEL GAME 
 
Fisheries negotiations like the ones studied here deal with the pursuit of economic 
values, a central feature in the relation between states. Security and stability are often 
regarded as the principal objectives of states in international politics, but after that 
welfare has an important place. Some scholars would even argue that security is not a 
goal in itself, only a precondition for the states‟ pursuit of welfare for their citizens.  
 
As fish quota negotiations may have a direct impact on the national welfare it is 
natural to expect close links between the international arena, where the negotiations 
take place, and the domestic arena. Putnam (1988:427) refers to this connection as “the 
entanglement of domestic and international politics”.  
 
From chapter 3 we recall the importance of a win-set, i.e. all bargaining outcomes 
which would “win” approval of the majority of the constituency at home. An 
agreement can only be reached if the parties have overlapping win-sets. As we have 
seen there is currently no agreement in place for North East Atlantic mackerel. In other 
words: the parties‟ win-sets do not overlap. Before I start examining this question it is 
necessary to obtain more knowledge of how the mackerel negotiations are conducted. 
 
5.1 Defining the negotiations process 
 
In order to engage in international negotiations on mackerel each party, represented by 
its delegation, needs a mandate. The mandate is crucial as it contains relevant 
background information and defines the national positions and priorities. It will 
usually also specify how much flexibility the negotiator has with regard to the top 
priorities and it will give an indication of the “bottom line”. For all of the four parties 
in the mackerel conflict it is a requirement that the mandate is politically approved at 
the highest level of the institution with the authority to negotiate. Usually the mandate 
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 There may also be instances where it is not written. However, it is an absolute requirement that priorities 
and positions are “understood” in the same way by the political leadership and the negotiator.  
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The negotiations on mackerel resemble other fishery negotiations in the sense that they 
are fairly structured. According to established procedure every meeting begins  with a 
plenary session where the parties participate with their full delegations. Each of the 
heads of delegation, typically a senior official from the fisheries authorities, will make 
an opening statement which refers to recent developments and information and 
highlights the party‟s main stance and priorities. If there has been an adjustment of 
previous positions or if the party intends to launch a new proposal or initiative, these 
will be presented. Still, the opening statements tend to be relatively short, and they are 
normally not used to elaborate much on details.  
 
The plenary meeting is then followed by a meeting of the heads of delegation plus one. 
The person who accompanies the head is usually a desk officer with extensive 
knowledge of the matter. In this meeting the parties go into detailed discussions. 
Statements made in the plenary will be elaborated on and the negotiators will try to get 
a better understanding of the other parties‟ positions. New ideas and proposals may be 
tried out to get an impression of where the other parties stand and how far they are 
willing to go. The format of heads plus one is considered to be crucial as the absence 
of the other delegation members, who may have narrower priorities and agendas, 
makes the negotiators speak with fewer constraints. Hence, it is easier to detect if there 




The meeting of the heads of delegation will be followed by consultations within the 
delegations and sometimes with the relevant constituents in the home countries. If new 
information emerged in the heads of delegation meeting, for example in the form of a 
new proposal on a particular area, this will be debated and weighted against own 
priorities. Some of the constituents may need to consult with the leadership of their 
organizations. In terms of Putnam‟s model this stage is a part of the Level II 
discussions, where the constituents discuss whether to approve an agreement. 
 
During a round of negotiations there will typically be several meetings of heads of 
delegation and numerous consultations within the delegations. If new information and 
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 Interview with official of the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs on 2 May 2011. 
35 
 
proposals are of such a nature that they would affect the existing positions in a 
significant way or make the negotiations take an unexpected turn, the head of 
delegation will consult the political leadership of his institution in the home country. 
He will inform them of the new developments, make suggestions as to how to react to 
them, discuss alternative course of action, and ask for acceptance with regard to 
possible next steps. 
 
If the delegations feel there is common ground with the potential to bring the 
negotiations forward, the negotiations can go on for days. On the other hand, if they 
have the impression that any consensus is still far away, the talks will be very short.  
 
Although the meetings play a decisive role in the mackerel negotiations we should not 
ignore what happens between the meetings. Statements by the chief negotiator, the 
political leadership of the institution with the authority to negotiate, or members of the 
delegation, most notably representatives of the fishery industry, are often made with 
the purpose of sending a signal to the other parties.  
 
The signals may have several functions ranging from bolstering own positions to 
indicating willingness to compromise. As public servants there are also limits to how 
negotiators can phrase their views in the public domain: “There are things that an 
official will find it difficult to say to the press because it could be viewed as an 
escalation. In such cases it is better that tough messages are sent by the industry 
instead”
35
.     
 
5.2 Level II constituents in the mackerel conflict 
 
In Putnam‟s terminology “ratification” refers to any decision-process at Level II that is 
required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement. It is a fact that the kind of 
agreement dealt with here does not require approval by the national assemblies. So 
which are the Level II constituents in the EU, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands?  
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The European Union 
 
The EU, by means of its composition and structure, is the most complex of the four. It 
is the European Commission, represented by the Directorate-General for Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries (also known as DG MARE), which is in charge of the 
negotiations. With regard to recommendations for TAC and fishing quotas DG MARE 
consults with its advisory body, the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (STECF). However, there are numerous other actors involved in the internal 
processes related to the mackerel negotiations. It is no coincidence that the EU 
delegations in the negotiations are by far the largest
36
. Many of these actors have the 
power to influence EU positions, at least in formal terms, but only a few have veto 
power over a tentative agreement on Level I. It should also be noted that there appears 
to be a certain degree of overlapping of roles and competences.  
 
The Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (PELRAC), a body consisting of the major 
pelagic industry interests but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), plays an 
important role on EU‟s Level II. PELRAC is an institution on Community level which 
mainly represents the industry and the vessel owner‟s interests, but the fact that other 
than purely industry actors are represented may influence the Council to take a slightly 
broader perspective with regard to the mackerel conflict
37
. In intense phases of the 
mackerel negotiations there will be frequent contact between DG MARE and 
PELRAC. 
 
There are important Level II actors on the regional and local level in the countries with 
significant mackerel fisheries, which are Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the latter 
these fisheries are concentrated in Scotland. In Ireland and Scotland the mackerel is by 
far the most important species for the local fishing fleets, both in volume and income. 
In several Scottish coastal communities, mackerel represents an extremely important 
source of income.  
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Fishing employment is mainly in the catching and processing sector. Although fishers 
represent a small percentage of the national workforce, fishing (from capture to 
handling, processing and marketing and final sale) is a particularly important socio-
economic activity in remote coastal regions where few alternative employment 
opportunities exist. In this regard it should be noted that the official unemployment 




An influential player in Scotland is the Scottish Pelagic Fishermen‟s Association 
(SPFA), which follows the mackerel conflict closely and has made several calls to the 
Commission to defend their members‟ interests
39
. It is national associations like the 
SPFA which represent the mackerel industry in PELRAC.  
 
What role is there for member countries in the mackerel conflict? Since fisheries are 
an area of competence of the European Community it is the Commission that has the 
final say. However, the member countries‟ governments and politicians have several 
ways to make their voices heard. Firstly, associations like the SPFA will also lobby its 
own government (in this case the Scottish Government and the Government of the 
United Kingdom) which can take the matter further, usually to the EU Council of 
Ministers. An Irish example of this course of action happened at a Council of Ministers 
meeting in July 2010, when the Irish Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, after 
having received grievances from his national fishing sector, complained that Iceland 




Secondly, members of the European Parliament (EP), typically members from fishery 
dependent regions, can bring up the matter in the EPs Committee on Fisheries and 
lobby national governments and the Commission. Like most politicians, members of 
the EP will also use the media to speak up for the interests of their constituents
41
.    
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It is difficult to find actors on Level II with a similar influence on the EU‟s position in 
the mackerel conflict as the as Scottish/British and Irish pelagic fishing interests and 
their allies, most notably their own governments. Even though the mackerel fisheries 
represent a tiny fraction of the EU‟s economy and have little economic importance 
also in their own countries, they enjoy enormous influence on the Union‟s stance in the 
negotiations. It is unlikely that the affected voters would be many enough to punish 
many politicians at the next elections, but it would not look good politically if the EU 
turned its back to these regions. It is therefore unconceivable to enter into an 




Norway has long fishery traditions all along its coast although they are of  greatest 
importance on the west coast and in the northern part of the country. In many 
municipalities in the north local employment relies almost entirely on the fisheries and 
related industries.  
 
However, if we look at the industry as a whole it is evident that the fisheries have lost 
much of their former importance. In 1950 the sector employed about 100,000 people 
but today the figure is less than 12,000, which only corresponds to approximately 0.5% 
of the working population
42
. The main part of the production is exported and the 
fisheries sector represents 5-6% of the total export earnings. This is of course not 
insignificant, but the income from oil and gas is many times bigger. The single most 
important species is farmed Atlantic salmon which has become a very profitable export 
commodity. Although the catches and exports of mackerel have gone up the last years 





The Norwegian fishing industry is highly organized. The peak organization which 
represents both owners and employees, is the Norwegian Fishermen‟s Association 
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(Norges fiskarlag). With respect to the pelagic fisheries the Association of Vessel 
Owners (Fiskebåtredernes forbund) plays a prominent role. It is common that 
representatives of these organizations participate as members of the Norwegian 
delegation in the mackerel negotiations. They are also consulted with respect to the 
formulation of the mandate although there is evidence that they are not as closely 
involved in this process as their counterparts in Iceland (Asgeirsdottir 2008:95).   
 
Even though the pelagic fleet provides important employment along the coast, 
especially on the west coast, it appears to have a less crucial role as job provider than 
in the case of some of the coastal regions in Scotland. This can partly be explained by 
the absence of land-based processing industry for mackerel. In addition, the 
Norwegian economy has been strong for many years and the unemployment rate is 
circa 3.5%. This is in part due to the impact of the profitable petroleum industry, 
which is concentrated in the western parts of the country. In some Scottish 
communities the local economy to a great extent relies on the income from the 
mackerel fisheries. This is less of a case in the western part of Norway and may 
explain why the political engagement in the mackerel conflict does not seem that great, 
at least for the time being. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the pelagic fishers have a 




The importance of the fisheries sector in the Icelandic economy has always been high. 
Although other industries have grown a great deal in recent years, most notably power-
intensive industries such as aluminum production, fisheries represent 40% of the 
export earnings and offers employment to 7% of the work force. It is no accident then, 
that the power of organized fishing interests in Iceland is large and some have gone so 
far as to say that what the vessel owners want, they get (Asgeirsdottir 2008:99).  
 
The main interest organization is the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners. 
The other groups that have delegates in the international negotiations process are the 
labor unions which represent the different groups working on fishing vessels. The 
influence of these groups does not match the influence of the vessels owners who 
40 
 
control all the capital. Although the two groups may be at odds in their home arenas 
they normally agree on a common line in the context of international negotiations 
(Asgeirsdottir 2008:96).  Historically the Icelandic Government has been willing to 
pursue fishery friendly economic policies, especially measures improving export 
earnings. In recent decades Icelandic authorities have created incentives for the 
development of other industries, like the above-mentioned aluminum industry.  
 
Another sector that developed rapidly in the years following 2000 was the banking 
sector, which collapsed in the autumn of 2008. The ensuing economic melt-down led 
to one of the worst economic crisis in Iceland‟s history, prompting the country to 
submit an application for EU membership in July 2009. The accession negotiations are 
not easy however, not least due to the fisheries sector, and the legacy of the banking 




Even though the Icelandic delegation is headed by an official from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs it is fair to say that the industry dominates Icelandic positions in the 
mackerel negotiations. In this regard it should be noted that the importance of 
mackerel in Icelandic fisheries has grown a great deal. We recall that the quota for 
2011 has been set to 146,818 tons. The quota for cod, traditionally one of the most 
important species for Iceland, has been set to 160,000 tons for the season 2010/2011
45
. 
It seems logical to conclude that on Iceland‟s Level II it is by and large up to the 
Icelandic pelagic fleet to decide whether an agreement is acceptable.  
 
The Faroe Islands 
 
The fisheries sector is extremely important for the Faroe Islands, which has a total 
population of less than 49,000 people. It employs 16% of the work force and 
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represents about 95% the export earnings
46
. It is telling that the economic performance 
of individual companies in the fisheries sector can have a significant impact on the 
local economy: in the last half of 2010 the unemployment rate jumped from 5.8% to 
6.9% due to the bankruptcy of the company Faroese Seafood
47
. An economy as the 
Faroese, with high dependence on fish products and exportation, is bound to be 
vulnerable to the changes in catches, fish prices, and exchange rates.  
 
Herring, blue whiting and mackerel are the foundation for the pelagic fleet. Like in all 
other fisheries consultations the industry participates in the preparations prior to the 
negotiations and is represented in the Faroese delegation. This gives the industry 
possibility to put forward their views and they may in that way influence the 
mandate
48
. The two main industry associations are the Faroese Shipowner‟s 
Association and the Faroese Pelagic Fleet. It is the Ministry of Fisheries which is in 
charge of the negotiations and the Minister authorizes the mandate prior to any round 
of talks. By law it is stipulated that if important foreign policy issues are at stake, the 
Minister shall consult the Committee of Foreign Policy of the Parliament. However, he 
may choose to follow the advice or not. 
 
It follows from this that the Faroese Level II is dominated by the interests of the 
pelagic fleet. Given the enormous importance of the fisheries sector in general , it 
would be unimaginable for the Faroese authorities to accept a Level I agreement that 
went against the fleet‟s interests to any significant degree. If they did they would run a 
high risk of being punished in the next elections.   
 
Summing up the Level II constituents 
 
There are many similarities between the Level II constituents in the four parties. The 
interests of the pelagic fishers, first and foremost represented by the vessel owners, 
have a significant weight in the formulation of positions.  
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This is in line with Putnam‟s assertion that we should expect that those constituents 
whose interests are most affected by the outcome of the process will exert special 
influence on the ratification.  
 
Even in the EU, where the mackerel is of negligible economic importance, the interests 
of some few coastal regions in the periphery appear to have veto power over the 
outcome. The fact that the fishing industry has decisive influence on whether to accept 
an agreement is easier to understand in the case of Iceland and the Faroe Islands, 
where the fishing sector is of paramount importance. Also in Norway it is to a large 
degree the pelagic interest groups which set the agenda, but the industry does not have 
the same significance as in the two former nations.  
 
It is difficult to discern additional interest groups or other actors on Level II with a 
stake in the mackerel negotiations. Given that the mackerel may become overfished 
one could have expected that conservation groups would make contact with the 
national authorities to ask for reductions in the quota demands, but this has not 
happened.  
 
5.3 Non-overlapping win-sets 
 
It is evident that the win-sets of the EU, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands do not 
overlap. In order to have a better basis for analyzing the different stages of the 
negotiations, it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at the nature of the four 
parties‟ win-sets.  
 
If it was only up to the EU and Norway, the coastal state agreement of 2008 would still 
be the basis for the distribution of the TAC for mackerel, perhaps with some minor 
adjustments to cater for the large influx of mackerel into Icelandic and Faroese waters. 
This means that the EU and Norwegian win-sets overlap. They may not overlap 
completely, as there will always be a certain motivation for increasing your own share, 





The Faroese win-set overlapped with those of the EU and Norway until mid 2010, 
when the country‟s authorities set a unilateral mackerel quota of 85,000 tons. By doing 
this they effectively broke out of the coastal state agreement. The size of the quota was 
significant and signaled that their win-set had been reduced a great deal. 
 
In contrast, Iceland‟s win-set has never overlapped with those of the EU and Norway. 
As long as the coastal state agreement was functional the country objected to the 
annual quotas which were put at the disposal of “other countries” within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Instead Iceland 
started to fish mackerel on a unilateral basis from 2006, first at low levels, but with a 
substantial increase from one year to another. In 2010 the Icelandic TAC was set to 
85,000 tons, a figure which upset both the EU and Norway, and clearly demonstrated 
that Iceland‟s win-set was both small and far away from the two other parties. 
 
With respect to 2011 both Iceland and the Faroe Islands chose to significantly increase 
their quotas, to 146,818 tons and 150,000 tons respectively. In Putnam‟s terminology 
they shrank their win-sets even further. As the EU and Norway did not adjust their 
own portion of the TAC for mackerel, these measures drastically increased the 
distance between the positions of Iceland and the Faroe Islands on one side, and the 
EU and Norway on the other.  
  
5.4 Distribution of power, preferences and coalitions on Level II  
 
According to Putnam‟s model the size of the win-set depends on the distribution of 
power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II constituents. How can we 
apply this to the mackerel negotiations? 
 
If constituents feel the cost of “no-agreement” is low, the win-set will be small. When 
I look at the negotiations process it seems obvious that the cost of no-agreement, at 
least for the time being, is low. Norway and the EU still apply the basic idea of the 
coastal state agreement on the TAC recommended by ICES, and Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands have set large unilateral quotas. If it was felt that the cost of these strategies 
was high the parties should be willing to make compromises at the negotiations table. 
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This does not seem to be the case and the reason is probably that there is currently a 
great deal of mackerel in the ocean.  
 
It is likely however, that the perception of costs will change as times goes by. If no 
agreement is reached for this and the coming year the mackerel stock will probably be 
severely overexploited. The result will be less fish available for the fishers, smaller 
landings and less income. If the fishing effort is so large that the biological balance of 
the stock is threatened – this may for example happen if the Spawning Stock Biomass 
(SSB) is reduced to an unsustainable level – the long-term state of the stock will be at 
risk. The consequence may be a long period of low catches and the introduction of 
strict measures to build up the population.  
 
One might expect that these long-term considerations would constantly influence the 
parties‟ positions, but so far this does not seem to be the case.  
 
In the mackerel conflict the interests of the level II constituents in the four parties 
appear to be pretty homogenous. It is difficult to detect any significant internal 
divergence. The way the conflict has evolved makes it safe to say that the four 
constituents are composed of hard-liners and the more the negotiator can win at Level 
I the better the odds for ratification on Level II.   
 
5.5 Political institutions on Level II  
 
Even though the institutions involved in the negotiations are relatively different the 
ratification is similar: there are few formal procedures and an agreement does not have 
to be voted on in the national assemblies. There is rather a process of continuous 
consultation and feedback between the officials heading the delegation and the 
representatives of the industry. The EU to some extent deviates from this procedure as 
a great deal of these consultations take place via representatives of the member 
countries
49
. Still, based on interviews and correspondence with fishery officials in all 
four countries the following pattern emerges: based on the mandate and the outcome of 
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the internal (Level II) consultations, which sometimes includes a couple of telephone 
conversation with the political leadership, the head of delegation will “understand” 
when an agreement is acceptable. So far there are few indications that proposals with 
“agreement potential” have been made by any of the parties.   
 
The question of which institution is in charge of the negotiations and how it relates to 
political institutions on Level II merits consideration. If the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is in the driving seat one could expect that the sector interests would be 
somewhat less influential as this Ministry is charged with upholding good political 
relations with other countries.  
 
The fact that in the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands it is the fisheries authorities 
heading the negotiations, could be an indication that other than purely fishery interests 
receives little attention. This, in turn, implies small win-sets. In reality the situation is 
more complex. In Norway the Ministry of Fisheries will consult with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in particular in issues related to international law
50
. If there are 
important foreign policy issues at stake the Foreign Ministry will be given greater role 
in the negotiations. So far this has not happened in the mackerel negotiations.    
 
In the case of the EU, DG MARE seems quite autonomous in the negotiations. For 
example, there does not seem to be any formalized contact between the DG MARE and 
the External Relations Service or the office of the High Representative of Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. Also in the case of the Faroe Islands there appears to be 
few effective constraints on the leading role of the Ministry of Fisheries. The Minister 
of Fisheries shall consult with the Foreign Policy Committee of the Parliament when 
foreign policy issues are at stake, but he does not have to follow its advice. When it 
comes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was only established in 2008, it 
appears to be politically weak
51
.     
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Iceland is the only country where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have a more 
formalized role
52
. However, to judge from the policy in the mackerel conflict it does 
not seem that general foreign policy issues are taken into account to any significant 
degree.   
 
In summary, the institutional set-up in the four parties is decisively geared towards the 
interests of the fishing industry. Few, if any, other concerns seem to play a role.   
 
5.6 Strategies of the negotiators, and attempts at restructuring the game 
 
Each negotiator has an obvious interest in maximizing the other side‟s win-set and he 
may use different techniques to this end. The best way to study the negotiators‟ 
strategies is to be present during the talks or read the parties‟ internal protocols 
afterwards. Since the negotiations are not open to the public and the protocols are 
exempt from the public domain, my focus will be on the negotiators‟ communication 
and the communication of his institution between the negotiations meetings.  
 
The parties have attempted to influence each other positions on many occasions 
throughout the conflict. The goal is to expand the win-sets of the opponents and 
thereby increase the likelihood of them accepting a deal that is as close as possible to 
your preferences. A great deal of the dynamics in the mackerel negotiations involves 
attempts by the players to restructure the game and alter the other parties‟ perceptions 
of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements. A frequent way 
to apply this strategy is to refer to (new) science. In the following I will consider these 
dynamics in more detail. 
 
In 2009 Norway and the EU started to realize that Iceland‟s catches of mackerel were 
about to become an important, if not welcome, component of the fishery. We recall 
that the relatively large Icelandic catch of mackerel in 2008 (112,000 tons) was 
increased to an even higher level in 2009 (116,000 tons). The Icelandic authorities 
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were well aware of this and issued a memorandum regarding the country‟s mackerel 
fisheries in 2009
53
. In the memorandum the following points were made: 
 
“Iceland is a coastal State with respect to the mackerel stock. Historic fishing patterns, including 
extensive mackerel fisheries on the border of the Icelandic exclusive economic zone, demonstrate 
that mackerel has consistently been in some abundance in waters under our national jurisdiction.... 
Iceland is in full right as a coastal State to utilize mackerel; however the right to use a shared stock 
comes with an obligation to cooperate with other coastal States according to the UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea. Iceland has for years sought to cooperate with the other coastal States for this 
purpose but have so far been rejected. The conservation and management of the mackerel stock is 
the collective responsibility of all the coastal States and it is paradox that at the same time as 
Iceland is accused of not being responsible it is excluded from the management consultations by 
the other coastal States...“. 
 
The document is an attempt to redefine the fundaments of the game: by constructing a 
link between the presence of mackerel and the Iceland EEZ, the case is made that the 
mackerel is in effect a shared stock and that Iceland has a historic right to it. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that Iceland for years has been seeking co-operation with 
the other coastal states to rectify what they consider to be an unjust arrangement.  
 
It is evident that by issuing the memorandum Iceland was hoping to create acceptance 
for its policies. In other words: Iceland tried to expand the EU and Norwegian win-
sets. As we know the attempt had little effect on their positions. The only effect it had 
was probably to bolster EU and Norwegian skepticism even further. As one Norwegian 
fishery official put it: “I‟ve been around quite some time and seen many Icelandic 
demands throughout the years. But the Icelandic history-based claim to the mackerel is 




So, rather than being forthcoming towards Icelandic arguments, EU and Norwegian 
reactions went in the opposite direction, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Iceland and 
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by all likelihood just confirmed what the Icelanders already suspected. In December 
2009 the country declares a unilateral TAC of 130,000 tons for the following year.  
 
Despite contact between the parties in the first half of 2010 no progress is made, and in 
July the Faroe Islands declare that they will catch 85,000 tons that same year. The 
ensuing reaction from Norway in the form of a unilateral ban on landings of mackerel 
from Faroese and Icelandic vessels from 29 July – effectively a form of economic 
sanction – was the most direct measure in the conflict so far. In Norway this kind of 
measure is almost “automatic” in cases where other nations do not take sufficiently 
responsibility for the management of a common resource
55
. By introducing the ban 
Norway tried to increase Iceland‟s and the Faroese Islands‟ costs of no-agreement and 
expand their win-sets.  
 
It is an open question whether the ban has had any real effect. Given that neither 
Iceland nor the Faroe Islands reduced their quota ambitions in the following period, it 
is tempting to conclude that the effect was minimal. Market reports for 2010 indicated 
that Iceland had few difficulties in landing and selling its mackerel
56
. It is likely that 
the main effect of the ban was symbolic, and on two levels: on one hand a strong 
signal was sent to Iceland and the Faroese Islands that their actions were inacceptable, 
and on the other hand the authorities demonstrated a clear commitment to help the 
Norwegian mackerel fishers.         
 
The Icelandic and Faroese quotas and the Norwegian ban on landings influenced EU 
rhetoric in the sense that the DG MARE started to speak of the possibility of sanctions 
against Iceland and the Faroe Islands. An EU-wide ban on landings was one of the 
options according to the Commissioner on Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, and she 
stated that the Icelandic decision to increase its mackerel quota risked impacting 
negatively on the country‟s negotiations to join the EU
57
. This was an unconcealed 
threat that the mackerel conflict had the potential to affect an issue of high political 
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importance to Iceland. By linking the two issues the conflict was escalated even 
further.  
 
In the eyes of the Commissioner the statement undoubtedly had the potential to 
increase the cost of no-agreement to the Icelanders. Again it is doubtful if the move 
had any notable effect as there is difficult se see any changes in the Icelandic win-set 
during the ensuing period. On the contrary, in a press release from the Icelandic 
Ministry of Fishery and Agriculture the threats of sanctions are vehemently refuted 
and it is stated that any such measure “would be a clear violation of the EFTA  
Convention, and the GATT and EEA Agreement”
58
.   
 
A major attempt at restructuring the game was made by the Faroese authorities in the 
form of an information memorandum issued in October 2010. The attempt was related 
to the discussion of the possible causes for the changed migration patterns for 
mackerel observed from 2006, and the consequences of these changes. In the past the 
bulk of the two northern spawning components mainly stayed west of the British Isles 
and in the North Sea, but the last years large quantities of mackerel have migrated 
northwards into Faroese and Icelandic waters. The scientists struggle to understand the 
causes for this new trend. Compared to other species such as the cod the mackerel 
prefers warmer water, so a possible reason for the shift in the migration pattern may be 
that the temperature of the surface water in the north Atlantic has increased.  
 
Some reports indicate that this has in fact happened, which in turn would be consistent 
with projections for global warming and the melting of the polar ice cap. However, 
there is no consensus among marine scientists as to which are the real causes for the 
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“The joint ecosystem survey carried out by the Faroe Marine Research Institute and marine 
research institutes in Norway and Iceland in July and August 2010 has confirmed that the 
distribution and abundance of mackerel is further west and north than previously measured, with a 
high density in the Faroese zone. Results from the 2010 egg survey, in which the Faroe Islands 
participated, confirm that mackerel also spawns in Faroese waters. This was already indicated by 
the results from the last egg survey in 2007…. It is with this basis that the Faroe Islands are 
seeking a larger share in a new multilateral management arrangement for mackerel”.  
 
In the memorandum it is claimed that not only does the mackerel spend considerable 
time in Faroese waters, it also spawns there. Spawning is often an important criteria in 
surveys aimed at mapping the distribution of a given stock. If you can prove that there 
is a great deal of spawning in your waters, you normally have a more solid basis on 
which to make a claim of “ownership”. In other words: by making the abovementioned 
assertion the Faroese authorities tried to establish convincing links between the 
presence of mackerel and quota demands. From internal Faroese discussions it also 
emerged that they, with respect to the assessment of stock distribution, wanted more 
weight to be attached to the location of the species in the summer months, the period 
with the greatest influx of mackerel
60
. The purpose of putting forward all these 
arguments was to influence the EU and Norwegian understanding of the distribution of 
the stock, and to make them widen their win-sets. 
 
As there is no consensus among scientists as to the causes of the changed migration 
patterns, there is so far little evidence that the Faroese strategy, also shared by Iceland, 
has had any effect. Although the Norwegian fisheries authorities acknowledge that the 
migration pattern of mackerel is undergoing changes they are not at all convinced that 
the changes will be of a lasting character: “If it turns out that the changes are only 
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Also the EU is profoundly skeptical towards the Icelandic and Faroese arguments that 
the mackerel, possibly due to warmer surface waters, have established itself in new 
areas on a lasting basis. In addition, DG MARE is of the view that one of the main 
reasons why mackerel is found in Icelandic and Faroese waters during parts of the year 
is that the stock is in a pretty good shape. The healthy state of the stock, DG MARE 
says, is primarily a result of the protective management by the long-standing coastal 
states. To the EU, the Icelandic and Faroese demands appear entirely unjustified: “The 
fact that Iceland and the Faroe Islands are now fishing huge quantities of mackerel is a 
case of free-riding on other states conservation efforts”
62
. The only conclusion I can 
draw from this is that the Faroese attempts at restructuring the game have been 
unsuccessful. 
 
The most recent round of talks was held in Oslo in March. No agreement was reached 
but according to the Icelandic Head of Delegation the talks were held in a constructive 
atmosphere
63
. The Norwegian Head of Delegation commented that the parties had only 
been 10-20% away from an agreement on the distribution of the mackerel quota. He 
added that the positive tone in part was a result of the Icelanders having relaxed their 
positions somewhat.  
 
However, the positive feeling quickly waned later the same month when the Faroese 
authorities declared a unilateral quota for 2011 “limited to 150,000 tons”. So if Iceland 
during the Oslo meeting took steps to expand its win set, the Faroe Islands, by means 
of this declaration, took the opposite course of action. According to the Faroese 
Ministry of Fisheries “This catch level is a clear reflection of the status and legitimate 
interests of the Faroe Islands as a major stakeholder in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel 
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. It is furthermore commented that the Faroe Islands are committed to working 
towards the aim of a transparent multilateral management of mackerel.  
 
There does not seem to be any willingness on the part of the EU and Norway to go into 
discussion with the Faroese authorities based on this claim, which hardly can be 
classified as a “reaching out” gesture. According to a Norwegian fisheries official “the 




What about sustainable management and the mackerel conflict? The fact of the matter 
is that all four parties play the conservation card, but no one seems willing to reduce 
own demands. Neither the two allies Norway and the EU, nor the two contestants 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands, are willing to take decisive steps in this direction. This 
is a paradox given that all four parties subscribe to modern principles of susta inable 
utilization of natural resources and have ratified relevant international conventions in 
this area.  
 
A feature which has characterized the conflict is mutual accusations of reckless 
behavior: since the very beginning of it the EU and Norway have labeled the Icelandic 
and Faroese catches “unregulated” and “irresponsible” with a huge potential to harm 
the state of the stock. Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the other hand, have claimed 
they have been excluded from real negotiations and forced to take unilateral measures. 
They add that this is done with the hope that the other two actors take Icelandic and 
Faroese shares into account in their quota decisions “with the view that the total 






In this chapter I have applied Putnam„s two-level games on the mackerel conflict in a 
situation of non-overlapping win-sets. The first thing I did was to elaborate on the 
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negotiations process. I then proceeded to defining the Level II constituents. An 
important finding was that the interests of the pelagic fishers exercise considerable 
interest over the positions of the four parties. In a scenario characterized by short -
sighted pursuit of economic interests this implies small win-sets. No other interest 
groups appear to have any real say in the countries‟ domestic sphere: this was the case 
in the Faroe Islands, which relies on the fisheries, as well as in Iceland and Norway, 
where other industries are far more important. A case in point is the EU which has few 
mackerel fishers in relative terms, but where the constituents represented by these 
fishers are politically important.  
 
As regards political institutions in charge of the negotiations I found that the fisheries 
authorities are in the driving seat even though there may be formal links to the foreign 
ministries, or obligations to consult with parliamentary bodies. The primacy of the 
fisheries authorities reduces the influence of non-fishing interests and may be 
conducive to small win-sets.  
 
I then proceeded to the strategies of the negotiators, where our main emphasis was put 
on the communication of the negotiating institution and the various attempts to 
restructure the game and influence the other parties‟ win-sets. The findings show that 
it is in particular Iceland and the Faroe Islands – the contestants if you will – which 
have made use of these strategies to gain acceptance for their policies, which is to 
expand the win-sets of the EU and Norway. These attempts have not been successful 
as Norway has introduced a landing ban and the EU has threatened to introduce 
sanctions.  
 
The Icelandic and Faroese responses have been to claim even higher quotas. These 
reactions reflect the power of the involved Level II constituents in the two countries. 
Although all parties subscribe to sustainable management policies the present 
atmosphere in the mackerel conflict is marred with mutual accusations of irresponsible 







In this chapter I will discuss the findings of the previous chapter in more detail. An 
important part of this exercise will be to assess whether Putnam‟s two-level model 
gives a satisfactory basis to answer my research question. In this discussion I also 
intend to make use of the lessons provided by Hardin‟s the tragedy of the commons.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I will discuss some future scenarios and possible 
solutions with respect to the mackerel conflict. Even though the situation today seems 
pretty hopeless previous experience shows that co-operation can emerge when the 
stakes of a conflict exceed acceptable levels.  
 
6.1 Discussion of the findings provided by the two-level model  
 
The research question of this thesis is “why are the European Union, Norway, Iceland 
and the Faroe Islands unable to agree on a distribution of mackerel that is acceptable to 
all parties?”. Or, to put it in Putnam‟s terminology, what is the reason why the win-sets 
of the EU and Norway do not overlap with those of Iceland and the Faroe Islands?  
 
Based on the findings in chapter five it seems that the setting of the mackerel conflict 
is conducive to small win-sets. It is obvious that the win-set of the smallest actor, the 
Faroe Islands, was small already in the beginning of July 2010, when the country‟s 
authorities said they were forced to leave the costal state agreement. Subsequent 
Faroese steps, in particular the decision to increase the unilateral quota to 150,000 tons 
in March 2011, decreased the win-set even further. Our findings indicate that these 
steps are related to the influence of the fisheries sector, most notably the vessel owners 
of the pelagic fleet. The interests of the pelagic fleet appear to have primacy over the 
interests of other parts of the fisheries sector. This is the only reason which can explain 
why the Faroe Islands seem unwilling to renew the annual bilateral quota agreement 
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with Norway, which includes cod and other species. For the affected Faroese cod 
fishers the absence of an agreement is having severe negative effects
67
.   
 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands have made several futile attempts to change the other 
two parties‟ perceptions of the reasons for the conflict. However, the attempts have 
merely bolstered EU and Norwegian positions and spurred threats of retaliation. 
 
The motives of the largest actor of the game, the EU, are somewhat puzzling. With a 
total population of more than 500,000 million people, the fate of some few thousand 
fishers in Ireland, Scotland and some other peripheral areas will hardly have any effect 
on the overall economy. Yet, the two-level game shows that there are powerful 
constituents with an interest in mackerel on the Union‟s Level II , and that it is 
politically impossible to ignore them. One explanation why these constituents are 
seemingly “punching above their weight”, may be related to general skepticism 
towards the EU in some of the affected countries, in particular in the United Kingdom. 
The Union depends on legitimacy to operate effectively, and one way of achieving 
legitimacy is to stand up for the constituents which are not always convinced of the 
merits of being a EU member.     
 
What if these constituents were weaker, would the EU then have a softer stance in the 
mackerel issue? According to Putnam‟s model the answer would be yes. However, it 
cannot be excluded that there are also interests at stake that I haven‟t detected in my 
analysis. For example, even if there were little pressure from the Union‟s fishers it 
would be unlikely that the EU would accept to be “pushed around” for a long time by a 
tiny island state like the Faroe Islands. Any country, also the EU, needs to defend its 
boundaries and position in the international system.   
 
When it comes to Iceland the win-set has never overlapped with those of the EU and 
Norway. Again the importance of the fisheries sector is crucial for our understanding 
of the country‟s course of action. However there is one element pertaining to Iceland 
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that appears to be insufficiently dealt with by the two-level model: the application for 
EU membership which was submitted in 2009 after the economic melt-down the year 
before. In my findings there are no indications that the Icelanders connect the question 
of EU accession to the mackerel issue. In the EU on the other hand, we have seen that 
the Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries has tried to create such a 
connection. 
 
It is natural to expect that the application was based on an analysis of costs and 
benefits of membership and that the Government concluded that the latter most likely 
will outweigh the former. It therefore seems logical to ask the following question: if 
the Icelandic Government has serious intentions about EU membership, why does it 
antagonize the Union in the mackerel issue? If Iceland really needs EU membership, 
wouldn‟t it be better to have a larger win-set in the negotiations and reach an 
agreement? 
 
As we know this has not happened. In fact, to judge from the country‟s positions it 
seems as if Iceland is negotiating from a strong position and not as a country which 
nearly avoided bankruptcy. In my opinion this seemingly peculiar position can be best 
explained by the low likelihood of Icelandic membership. It has been decided that the 
issue of EU accession will be the subject of a public referendum when the accession 
agreement is ready. Since opinion polls over time have shown that a clear majority of 
the Icelanders are against joining, there are really no reasons for the negotiating 
institution to pretend that the country will become a member. So why take a softer 
stance in the mackerel talks with the EU?   
 
Norway is far less dependent on the mackerel incomes than the Faroese Islands and 
Iceland. The two latter countries therefore have higher constraints and thereby a 
bargaining advantage, ceteris paribus. The Norwegian fisheries sector is far from 
insignificant, but the big values are found in other species such as farmed salmon. 
Besides, the parts of the country that are politically sensitive when it comes to the 
fisheries are the three northernmost counties. Few mackerel fishers are found in that 




Nevertheless, the mackerel has a certain importance in Norway and the findings in 
chapter five strongly indicate that the authorities are committed to defending the 
interests of the mackerel fishers. In September 2011 local and regional elections will 
be held, and it cannot be excluded that the mackerel conflict will be on the agenda in 
some areas. This may result in more lobbying towards the Government by the pelagic 
fishing associations in the coming months. We know that any change in the allocation 
has profound economic consequences for the fishermen involved in a particular fishery 
and this gives them a strong incentive to influence the distributive outcome 
(Asgeirsdottir 2008:142). Any lobbying will aim for upholding the pressure and 
maintaining positions, i.e. to avoid an expansion of the Norwegian win-set. In order to 
not lose quotas it is crucial for the sector interests to constantly exercise pressure on 





Has Putnam‟s model all in all given us satisfactory answers to the question I posed in 
the thesis‟ introductory chapter? I have undoubtedly gained valuable insights into the 
reasons why the four parties are unable to agree on an agreement for the mackerel. The 
two-level model is useful in this regard as it gives an analytical tool for assessing the 
impact of domestic constraints and considerations on the developments of the 
mackerel negotiations. However, it would be desirable to “dig a l ittle bit deeper” with 
respect to the underlying social dynamics which prevent co-operation from emerging. 
It therefore seems justified to see if Hardin‟s model can complement our understanding 
of the matter at hand.              
 
6.2 Hardin’s model revisited 
 
The North Atlantic is vast and in practice it is difficult to control or restrict access to 
many of the fishing banks. To implement an effective and strict regime of access 
control would be extremely costly in terms of monitoring and surveillance resources. 
This is particularly true for the international waters. With regard to the countries‟ EEZ, 
where the greater part of the mackerel is captured, the home country has, according to 
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international conventions, exclusive rights to the resources. However, these rights may 
conflict with other international legal instruments such as regional fishery agreements.  
 
The point here is not to embark on a discussion of which legal instrument should have 
primacy over the other, but rather to underline that there is no way, at least no physical 
way, that other countries can exclude the home country from harvesting a resource 
within its waters. In other words:  the EU and Norway cannot exclude Faroese fishers 
from fishing mackerel inside the Faroese EEZ. As we learned in chapter three this 
property of the mackerel stock is referred to as non-excludability.    
 
If Norwegian fishers catch a substantial amount of North East Atlantic mackerel the 
amount available to the fishers of the other countries will diminish. Hence, one fisher‟s 
“use” of the mackerel will have consequences for other fishers. This property of the 
mackerel is referred to as rivalness of consumption. Taken together, non-excludability 
and rivalness of consumption make North East Atlantic mackerel a common pool good, 
which are susceptible to “a tragedy of the commons”. 
 
In chapter three I presented the view that Hardin‟s model may be a useful analytical 
model rather than an empirical representation, and that the tragedy of the commons 
should be regarded as an “ideal-type” tragedy which can be a helpful tool for 
comparison with real world situations. How does this fit our findings? 
 
As the mackerel conflict stands today the usefulness of Hardin‟s insights seem to go 
beyond those that follow from a simple application of an analytical model. As noted 
earlier the advice of ICES with regard to the TAC for mackerel in 2011 is 646,000 
tons. In stark contrast to this figure we have the sum of the quotas of the coastal states 
and the unilateral quotas of Iceland and the Faroe Islands, which altogether amount to 
942,818 tons. So, if no agreement is reached and the fishermen find the mackerel, this 
is the volume that will be removed from the stock this year, a volume that is 46% 
higher than the recommended level. There is little doubt that the way things have 




The extent of the tragedy will depend on many factors. The mackerel is a fast growing 
and short-lived species with a relatively high resilience. If the overfishing only goes on 
for a short time, say for a year or two, and the natural conditions create a good basis 
for a couple of strong year classes, the damage to the stock may not be that large. On 
the other hand, if the overexploitation lasts for years, in combination with weak year 
classes, the impact on the stock may be serious and long-term. 
 
In Hardin‟s article the solution to the problem was some kind of coercion, to make the 
actors break out of their selfish and narrow-minded behavior. The kind of coercion 
should be mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected. It is evident 
that I cannot extrapolate this solution to our case. The EU, Norway, Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands are four sovereign actors as far as fisheries are concerned, and there is no 
overarching international structure with the power to impose a solution.  
 
If all the players were members of the EU there would have been structures and 
procedures in place to work out a solution with the potential of avoiding overfishing, 
but in light of the foreign policy priorities of Norway and the Faroese Islands this 
scenario is pretty remote
69
. Another way of “solving” the problem would be that the 
bigger actors forced the smaller actors to comply with the formers‟ priori ties, for 
example by means of sanctions. However, as we have seen the measures taken so far 
appear to have zero effect on Icelandic and Faroese policies.  
 
Could there be any useful insights to gain from the critics of Hardin‟s model, for 
instance those who believe that the users‟ inherent interest in sustainable utilization of 
the resource is a basis for co-operation? The point merits consideration as it is an 
undeniable fact the users in this conflict, the fishers, have a fundamental interest in 
preserving the mackerel stock for the years ahead. If the stock gets depleted it is the 
fishers and their families who will be hardest hit. The common interest in the future of 
the stock should therefore, in principle, be a convincing reason to work together. So 
why does such co-operation fail to emerge? 
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It should be noted that a kind of co-management is difficult to imagine as this concept 
usually is associated with local communities where the inhabitants have much closer 
relations than in the case of fishers dispersed in four different countries. A more 
fruitful way of answering the question is probably to consider the problem of free-
riding: why should I take responsibility for preserving the stock, in other words reduce 
my catches, when the other fishers just keep on fishing? In essence, free-riding was the 
worry of the fishery official of DG MARE with respect to the quota increases of 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands. His view was that their unilateral quotas were a kind of 
free-riding on the conservation efforts of the other actors.      
 
An interesting question to ask at this stage is how the stalemate represented by a 
tragedy of the commons situation can be “unlocked”. Given the small win-sets of the 
involved players there is currently not much reason for optimism. A less pessimistic 
view would be to hope that previous experiences of overfishing and depleted fish 
stocks at some point will make the actors realize the full consequences of the excessive 
quota demands, and force them back to the negotiations table.     
 
6.3 Possible future scenarios 
 
The implications of the current stalemate in the negotiations are rather gloomy. 
Massive overfishing seems imminent, and once again it is demonstrated that despite all 
kinds of (theoretical) commitments to sustainable management, states are not capable 
of sharing a natural resource in a responsible manner. At the end of the day short -
sighted perceptions of economic gain prevail over long-term preservation of an 
important resource.    
 
In the following I intend to elaborate on three possible scenarios for the mackerel 
conflict: a depletion scenario, an overfishing scenario, and a sustainability scenario.  
 
The depletion scenario 
 
The depletion scenario is the most pessimistic of the three scenarios. Its point of 
departure is that the Faroese decision in March 2011 to increase the unilateral quota to 
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150,000 tons has set the standard for the whole negotiations process. This means that 
any new initiatives in the time ahead will have a negative rather than a positive 
connotation. The preconditions for this scenario are than the pelagic fishers maintain 
or increase their decisive influence over negotiations positions in Norway, Iceland and 
the Faroe Islands. If the mackerel is perceived as essential in the creation of jobs the ir 
influence will increase, especially in the Faroe Island, where the fishing companies 




With the prospect of 46% overfishing of the recommended TAC in 2011, the EU will 
impose sanctions against Iceland and the Faroese Islands. The sanctions will be stricter 
than the Norwegian landing ban on mackerel introduced last year and possibly include 
a general ban on all Faroese and Icelandic landings in EU ports. 
 
As the conflict continues on an escalating trend in the second half of 2011, ICES 
Advice for 2012, normally made public in the beginning of October, will paint a 
negative picture of the state of the stock and recommend a reduction of the TAC. 
Although all parties will point at the recommended TAC and underline their 
commitment to responsible measures, no one will make concessions. The EU and 
Norway will as in previous years focus on the importance of the coastal state 
agreement and reserve the bulk of the TAC for themselves, based on the long-term 
bilateral management plan. Iceland and the Faroese Islands will set unilateral quotas 
similar to the levels of 2011. The result is another year characterized by severe 
overfishing.  
 
Throughout 2012 there will be contact between the parties with a view to reach an 
agreement for the distribution. However, the parties are now so antagonized that 
nobody is willing to compromise. There will be frequent mutual accusations of 
irresponsible behavior and the conflict on mackerel will impact negatively also on a 
range of other fisheries agreements, possibly causing their cancellation or suspension.    
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In 2013 the stock is so depleted that the fishers have difficulties locating the fish, but 
as mackerel prices are high in the international market the race for the fish continues 
until the stock and profits literally vanish. At this point the parties manage to agree on 
a future distribution of the TAC, but it is evident that it will take at least a decade to 
build up the stock. 
 
The overfishing scenario 
 
In this scenario the stock is not depleted, “only” overfished. The starting point is 
similar to that of the previous scenario and both 2011 and 2012 will be characterized 
by too high catches. However, in the second part of 2012 it becomes evident that  there 
is less fish around. In addition, the economic sanctions imposed by the EU are starting 
to have a serious impact on the Icelandic and Faroese economies. Especially the 
Faroese Islands are feeling the pinch and the authorities begin to realize that they have 
to reconsider their policy. The two island states request a new round of talks and say 
they are willing to reduce their demands. After tough negotiations an agreement is 
reached whereby Iceland and the Faroese Islands get significant shares of the TAC. 
However, the bulk of the quota is still shared between the EU and Norway.    
 
In this scenario the mackerel stock will be severely overfished and ICES will propose 
that some important mackerel areas should be closed for the time being. However, the 
stock has not been reduced to levels that seriously damage its long-term condition. The 
recommended TAC will be low for a number of years, but provided that no overfishing 
occurs the stock will be back at healthy levels within five years.  
 
The sustainability scenario 
 
This is the more optimistic scenario of the three and anticipates that the developments 
during the first half of 2011, not least the unilateral Faroese quota increase, will make 
the involved parties realize that urgent action is required. Norway will take the 
initiative to a new round of talks in the early autumn and will, after consultations with 
the EU, show more flexibility than in previous rounds. Iceland, which showed 
willingness to expand its win-set in March, will continue in the same fashion and make 
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some additional concessions. The Faroese Islands realize that the conflict has the 
potential to create more damage than gain. An indication of this materialized on 13 
April 2011, when a Faroese fishing company‟s application for  environmental 
certification by Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was rejected
71
.   
 
After a couple of difficult negotiations meetings during the autumn, they finally agree 
on a new coastal state agreement for mackerel that is acceptable to all parties. ICES 
advice continues to be the basis for the agreed TAC. The distribution of the quota 
gives Iceland and Faroe Islands significant portions whereas the EU and Norway, in 
particular the latter, accept reductions. With this arrangement the TAC for 2012, 
somewhat reduced compared to 2011, is in line with the advice by the ICES scientists, 
and the mackerel stock continues on a high level in the following years.  
 
A comment on the scenarios 
 
It must be underlined that these scenarios are entirely hypothetical, but hopefully they 
can serve as “lines of thought” as to where the development could be heading in the 
coming years. It is hard to say which scenario is more likely. To judge from the rather 
pessimistic attitude expressed by the fishery officials who have been interviewed, it 
would be tempting to say that the sustainability scenario is unrealistic. The depletion 
scenario on the other hand, is both extreme and pretty distrustful of the parties‟ 
commitment to sustainable management, but given the current circumstances it cannot 
be entirely rejected. Still, the overfishing scenario probably represents a “middle 
ground” with a higher likelihood of becoming real than the other two.      
 
A lot of factors will influence the way ahead in the mackerel conflict. For example, if 
the mackerel migration patterns again changes, either back to what they used to be or 
in a new and unexpected fashion, this will have a direct impact on the negotiations. In 
a two-level perspective such changes have the potential to alter the power and 
influence of domestic actors.    
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In this chapter I have discussed the findings of our analysis of the mackerel conflict. A 
central concern was whether the theoretical framework I employed in our study, 
Robert Putnam‟s two-level model for international negotiations, was fruitful in terms 
of answering our research question.  The discussions revealed that the model yields 
several insights into the reasons why an agreement on mackerel has not been 
concluded. One such insight was that the domestic groups that will be most affected by 
the outcome of the negotiations exercise decisive influence. This was evident also in 
the EU where the affected constituents, relatively speaking, represent small economic 
interests.    
 
To get a better understanding of the underlying social dynamics preventing co-
operation, I elaborated on Hardin‟s tragedy of the common in the context of the 
mackerel conflict. I found that the model is a fairly good representation of the current 
difficult situation.  
 
I the last section I depicted three different scenarios for the way ahead: the depletion 
scenario, the overfishing scenario, and the sustainability scenario. I concluded that the 
second scenario appears to be the most likely one. 
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7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The exploitation of commercially important fish stocks straddling political boundaries 
in the ocean entails serious distributional challenges to interstate co-operation. The 
allocation of economic values associated with a shared resource is complicated in 
itself, but in fisheries it is of vital importance that the management decisions also take 
long-term sustainability concerns into account. Since our knowledge of the dynamics 
of the species‟ biological parameters will never be complete, these decisions have to 
be made against a backdrop of uncertainty. This is not an unfamiliar feature in 
fisheries management. However, the distributional challenge becomes acute when the 
species of interest, the North East Atlantic mackerel, seems to be changing its 
migration patterns. In theory there exist powerful incentives to facilitate co-operative 
management in fisheries as the absence of it all too often leads to depleted stocks, but 
it remains to be seen if these incentives will prevail in the mackerel conflict.  
 
In this thesis my intention has been to examine recent initiatives and actions by the 
European Union, Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands with respect to the mackerel 
conflict. In this conflict the EU and Norway have similar standpoints as they both 
defend the merits of the old coastal state agreement. On the other side of the table we 
have Iceland and the Faroe Islands, the contestants, claiming that new developments 
must lead to new management rules. Although all four parties subscribe to the 
principles of sustainable management, they have so far been unable to forge a new 
agreement and a distribution of the TAC that is acceptable to everybody. In fact, if we 
add up all the quota demands for 2011 we will be facing a situation where the actual 
catches exceed the recommended level by 46%. The main objective of my analysis was 
to uncover the reasons for this worrying situation.  
 
The analytical tool I employed to this end was Putnam‟s two-level model for 
international negotiations, which proposes a structured way to study how domestic 
actors act to influence and constrain negotiations between states. This choice of 
analytical tool appeared justified given that the distribution of the TAC of mackerel 
will be decided in negotiations between the four parties. However, as lack of co-
operation with respect to a common natural resource is at the core of my problem 
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definition, it made sense to also present important insights derived from Hardin‟s 
study of the tragedy of the commons. 
 
An important finding was that the interests of the pelagic fishers have substantial 
influence of the four parties‟ priorities and positions in the negotiations. These groups 
effectively enjoy veto power over the outcome of the negotiations, a fact that was 
particularly evident in Iceland and the Faroe Islands, the two countries with highest 
dependence on the fisheries sector. Also in the EU the mackerel fishers and their allies 
on member country level, most notably in Scotland, enjoy decisive influence. Their 
influence is first and foremost related to political concerns as the economic impact of 
the mackerel fishery in the EU, in relative terms, is negligible. In Norway the mackerel 
fishers dominate the country‟s positions, but in a context of low unemployment and 
good economic prospects in other sectors, there is no guarantee that they over time will 
be able to mobilize consistent and large political support.  
 
Another interesting finding was that the attempts to increase the opponent‟s costs of  
no-agreement, for example Norway‟s landing ban on Icelandic and Faroese mackerel, 
or EU‟s threats to introduce sanctions, seem to have little effect. The same can be said 
about the Icelandic and Faroese endeavors to alter the EU and Norwegian perceptions 
of how the new migration pattern have affected the issue of where the stock belongs.  
 
The fact that the parties‟ win-sets appear to be small does not bode well for the 
prospects of an agreement. Or rather: as the matter stands today there are few 
indications that substantial over-fishing can be avoided. In many ways the situation 
bears resemblance to the tragedy of the commons. If such a scenario materializes it 
would not be the first time neighboring countries prove unable to co-operate on the 
management of a scarce natural resource.         
 
In past conflicts over shared stocks or access to stocks between Norway and Iceland, 
the pattern has been that the smallest and most fishery dependent country of the two, 
Iceland, has achieved the best deal (Asgeirsdottir 2008). It is too early to say how the 
mackerel conflict will unfold in the time ahead, but being small and heavily dependent 
on fisheries will normally be a bargaining advantage because the negotiators are more 
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constrained by domestic actors and concerns than their counterparts from the bigger 
states. It should not be excluded that the solution to the mackerel conflict, and 
hopefully a resumption of responsible management of this important resource, will 
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